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During 1958 economic conditions in Indonesia reached their lowest
ebb since the collapse of the Korean War boom early in 1952. The major
contributing factor was the abortive revolution in the outer islands against
left-wing tendencies, corruption, and ineffective economic policy in
Djakarta , Other factors were the continuing fll in prices of major exports
and the disruption of banking and transport through the Government 's
assumption of control over certain Dutch enterprises and the departure of
thousands of Dutch managers and technicians. Together these developments
brought increased budget expenditures, reduced tax revenues , diminished
foreign exchange earnings, delays in the development program, and general
deterioration,
The impact of the revolution is clear enough from the figures. When
he first assumed office in the middle of 1957 Finance Minister Sutikno Slamet
hoped to keep the 1958 budget deficit down to Rp. 1.5 billion. By the time
the year began the estimate was already up to Rp. 3.5 billion, and at time
of writing it appeared that it would exceed Rp. 9 billion before the year
was out. The groxth of the deficit can be explained partly from the revenue
side; the head tax on foreigners has been disappointing as to yield and
the rebellion led to some loss of revenues. The main factor, however, has
been the cost of fighting the rebellion, Prime Minister Djuanda has esti-
mated the total cost of the insurrection, including loss of output as well
as increased military expenditures, as more than Rp, 3,5 billion.
2As a consequence of the swelling deficit the note circulation
increased by nearly 50 per cent between mid-1957 and mid-1958, and
continued to soar thereafter. The inflation which had long been endemic
became epidemic. By the middle of 1958 the cost-of -living was rising
by 3 to 4 per cent per month.
Inflationary tendencies were aggravated by reduced domestic pro-
duction and by further cuts in imports, which were in turn necessitated
by the loss of foreign exchange earnings. Rice imports, despite the
concentrated effort to achieve self-sufficiency in rice, will exceed
700,000 tons or 10 per cent of total requirements. Rice imports alone
cost Indonesia $75 million annually. Estate production has held up
remarkably well (see Table) but smallholders' rubber, which has become
more important than estate rubber since independence, fell far below the
1957 level, Moreover the losses through the barter trade, which even in
1957 cost the government some $100 million in foreign exchange ($60
million on Central Sumatra exports alone) were higher still in 1958.
Exports of smallholders* products in general were Rp. 687 million in
the first half of 1958 as compared to Rp. 1,711 million for the same
period of 1957. By the end of September the Bank of Indonesia reserves
were down to 7.0 per cent of the note circulation, as compared to the
former legal ratio of 20 per cent. Imports of luxuries were cut out
altogether, and imports of semi-luxuries and even some necessities were
drastically curtailed.
Thus 1958 will go down as a black year in the economic history of
the infant Indonesian republic. Yet it may also become known as the year
3of the turning point. For while the rebellion had unfavorable effects
on the Indonesian economy in 1958, it was itself the result of unsatis-
factory economic conditions in large measure. Ever since Indonesia won
her Independence at the end of 1949 the performance of her economy has
disappointed both her foreign wellwishere and the Indonesians themselves.
Most Indonesians thought that "Merdeka" would bring prosperity auto-
matically; when it didn't, they blamed the central government, or foreigners,
and blamed Djakarta for the continued foreign hold on the economy.
Disappointment and dissatisfaction were particularly keen in the outer
islands, where most of the big plantations, mines, oil fields and
refineries are located. With their abundant resources and relatively
low populations, the people in the outer islands thought they could get
along very well if it were not for blunders, dishonesty, and political
manoevering in Djakarta. In February of 1958 the pent-up disgruntlement
burst out in the form of a revolutionary government with headquarters in
Central Sumatra, headed by the former Governor of the Bank of Indonesia,
Sjaffrudin Prawiranegara.
Indonesian leaders recognize that the military defeat of the rebels
does not solve the problems which gave rise to the revolt. After years of
neglecting economic development for power politics, the Indonesian leader-
ship has been forced by the rebellion to put economic stabilization and
development at the top of the agenda. While the insurrection was the
dominant event of the year, the Indonesian economic situation in 1958
was an amalgam of influences of events during the year, influences from
the two decades of bewilderingly rapid change, and the three previous
4centuries of relative quiescence.
Few countries have experienced so marked an acceleration of the
pace of their histories as Indonesia has undergone since the beginning
of World War II. Dutch rule was designed to expand exports while keeping
the domestic Indonesian society and economy as undisturbed as possible.
Then came the war, Japanese occupation, revolution, independence, eight
stormy years of internal struggle for power, and revolution again. But
the real problem has been lack of decision. The heritage from the Dutch
was a badly distorted economy, with exports concentrated on a few
commodities highly sensitive to the vagaries of the world market, with
no indigenous financial, trading, or transport sector, and with little
processing of domestic raw materials within the country. The Dutch also
left Indonesia with per capita incomes under $100 per year,--in the peasant
agriculture sector where most Indonesians earn their livelihood it was
under $50 per year--with illiteracy near 90 per cent (probably higher
'than in 1600) and with no such cadre of trained civil servants and business
executives as the British left behind in India. The twenty years of
turmoil left Indonesia with impaired plant, equipment, and transport
facilities, loss of foreign expertise of every kind, sadly depleted foreign
exchange reserves, chronic and accelerating inflation, intensified political
conflict, and deepening and spreading disillusionment.
In terms of cold figures the prognosis for the Indonesian economy
would seem to be worse than ever. Yet in a curious boomerang fashion the
very depths to which 1958 brought Indonesia improves the outlook for the
future. For during the past year the Indonesian leadership has learned
5four valuable lessons:
1. Political stability and economic development are not two separate
problems. No government can "let economic development wait" while it
manoevres to keep in power. On the contrary, the basic political struggle--
a struggle between outer islands and Center, and between Communists and
left-wing Nationalists on the one hand and moderate-rationalists on the
other--cannot be resolved without a program of economic development. The
essence of such a program must be measures that will feed and clothe the
Javanese while building on the growing points and leading sectors of the
outer islands; the problem of providing jobs for Javanese outside the over-
crowded peasant agriculture sector must be tackled in the second phase of
the program,
2. Raising Indonesian incomes requires making the pie grow; redivid-
ing the pie--even redividing it between Indonesians and foreigners--is not
enough,
3. Communist parties are not easy to utilize for one's ownnon-
Commnist purposes. Both the Nationalist Party and President Sukarno
are considerably less enthusiastic now than they were a yoar ago about
collaboration with the Communist Party.
4. Government by "musjarawat desa"--unanimous opinion of the village--
doesn't really work at the national level. A central government cannot
just postpone awkward decisions on which there is no unanimous agreement.
Certain basic decisions must be made now: on the constitution of the
proposed new National Planning Board, on the scope and content of a new
6Development Plan, on the foreign investment, mining, and petroleum laws,
on the allocation of powers between central and regional governments. If
for no other reason, the growing impatience and growing power of General
Nasution and the Army command would make decisions on these matters urgent.
With the learning of these lessons Indonesia's "absorbtive capacity"
for foreign aid is higher than ever before. Hitherto the chief obstacle
to effective use of foreign aid (and Indonesia has received less assistance
per capita than any other country) has been her lack of "development
mindedness" and her unwillingnes to make decisions on development plans,
programs and projects when such decisions were thought to entail political
risks. Now that Indonesia leaders have learned that development must be
given top priority and that decisions must be made, Indonesia could absorb
effectively some $100 million per in foreign aid: $50 million under
surplus commodity disposal programs to feed and clothe Java, and $50
million for the well-planned big projects in the outer islands--the
Asahan Valley scheme, the Sumatran highway, the Atjeh railwary, the South
Sumatra ferilizer plant, reclamation projects in Kalimantan (Borneo), and
the like. If Indonesia does not start on the road to economic development
in 1959 with a non-Communist program, she is likely to be lost forever
to the free world. The year 1959 should be "help Indonesia year."
The prospects for foreign private investment in Indonesia are still not
too bright, although the departure of so many Dutch enterprises opens the
door to other foreigners. However, the atmosphere for foreign private
enterprise is likely to improve as Indonesia's own class of rising
7entrepreneurs becomes more firmly established and as economic development
becomes apparent. Given a few years of liberal assistance with her
development program, Indonesia can become an attractive area for foreigr
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Index figures for the value of export licenses (1950 monthly average = 100)
1954
100
78
98
81
61
96
113
65
106
117
115
96
1955
136
124
97
101
52
136
87
130
116
145
192
73
1956
98
127
108
136
102
114
92
137
77
119
126
109
1957
87
79
137
63
69
75
155
88
78
104
84
52
1958
36
74
44
40
49
57
62
70
72
106
113
94
116
112
89
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